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1 Introduction
There are compelling reasons why globalization should aﬀect human capital
accumulation. The relevant research typically refers to workers’ incentives to
acquire human capital: Globalization aﬀects both the returns to education
and its costs. With respect to costs, there are two influence channels (Car-
tiglia 1997). First, because trade has income eﬀects, it changes the liquidity
constraints that workers are facing, and thus their ability to invest into ed-
ucation. Second, by increasing the relative wages of skilled workers, trade
openness also increases the costs of education.
However, economic integration not only aﬀects the costs from education,
but also the returns. For instance, globalization appears to raise the diﬀer-
ence between skilled and unskilled wages (Feenstra and Hanson 2001). Other
things being equal, this would suggest that globalization increases the return
from education. On the other hand, there may be countervailing forces, relat-
ing particularly to sector-specific human capital investments. Rodrik (1997)
argues that uncertainty about sector-specific shocks brought about by glob-
alization may reduce the incentives to acquire sector-specific skills, unless
adequate insurance mechanisms are present. Thus, globalization should lead
to a shift from sector-specific to general human capital investment (Kim and
Kim, 2000).
All of these studies concentrate on workers’ incentives to acquire human
capital. It is well known, however, that a considerable part of education and
training is financed by firms. This is not only true for firm-specific human
capital, but also for sector-specific or even general human capital.1 This pa-
per investigates how globalization aﬀects firms’ incentives to invest in general
human capital. We start from the fundamental puzzle that Becker (1964) and
Mincer (1974) have identified: At least in competitive labor markets, firms
should have no incentive to bear the costs of general worker training, as the
associated rents are captured by the employees. Recent theoretical work has
1See e.g. Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell et al. (1996), Goux and Marin (1997),
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998), Regner (1995, 1997) and Vilhuber (1997,1998).
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presented arguments that resolve the puzzle, many of which rely on asym-
metric information.2
In the following, we analyze the eﬀects of globalization on worker training.
To this end, we use an alternative resolution of the general training puzzle,
which relies on Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003). There, we argue that the
extent of worker training and the intensity of competition on product mar-
kets are closely related: Broadly speaking, less intensive competition fosters
training incentives. The relevance of these ideas for international product
market integration is obvious: the increase in firm numbers that is brought
about by the integration of markets is an instance of more intense competi-
tion. Other things being equal, product market integration should therefore
make general worker training less likely. However, this cannot be the full
story, as integration also increases market demand. This, in itself, increases
incentives for training. In the paper, we show how these eﬀects interact.
We analyze two cases, the immobile worker model and the mobile worker
model. In both cases, we consider two initially separated national product
markets, each of which is a Cournot oligopoly. Product market competition
is preceded by a training stage in which each firm can decide whether to
train its workers or not. Firms whose workers have been trained have lower
marginal production costs than those without trained workers, as workers are
more productive. In both cases, we consider the eﬀects of market integration:
An integrated market is described by the same model, except that the firm
number and the market demand are both twice as high as before.
In the immobile worker model, workers are prohibited to move both within
and between countries, so that the Becker-Mincer puzzle is defined away. The
game only consists of the training stage and product market competition. In
the mobile worker model, there is an interim stage in which firms make wage
bids for each others workers. The eﬀects of market integration on training
2Examples include Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1995, 1996), Abe
(1994), Prendergast (1992), Glaeser (1992), Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) provide an insightful survey of the arguments.
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incentives are similar in both cases. First, suppose the two countries are
small initially, meaning that the firm number and demand are both small.
Then, integration increases incentives for training, and for suitable parameter
values market integration leads to a training equilibrium where none existed
before. If countries are suﬃciently large initially, a training equilibrium can
be destroyed by market integration. The same conclusions emerge if workers
are only mobile within national borders.
In addition to product market integration, we also consider labor mar-
ket integration. At first glance, when workers face more options concerning
future employers, the willingness of firms to train their workers should be
reduced. However, we show that, at least in our setting, labor market inte-
gration usually has no eﬀect on training decisions.
While our main focus is on the integration of countries with the same sort
of training by firms, we also apply our analysis to countries that face compe-
tition in product markets from countries that have other or no training sys-
tems. For example, countries with apprenticeship systems, such as Germany,
face competition by firms headquartered either in countries with vocational
schooling systems or in low-skilled countries with no or little training. We
show that such competition is indeed a threat to apprenticeship systems.
There has been a thorough discussion about the slow decline of the num-
ber of apprentices in countries such as Germany3. Our analysis points to a
complementary argument for this decline. Globalization makes it more diﬃ-
cult to sustain apprenticeship systems and without government intervention
such systems are prone to decline in a globalized world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the model with
immobile workers. Section 3 introduces the model with mobile workers, and
provides reduced form conditions for training equilibria. Section 4 applies
these conditions to a numerical example. Section 5 analyzes how global-
ization, that is labor and/or product market integration aﬀects the chances
that training equilibria arise. Section 6 extends the analysis to countries with
3See e.g. Euwals and Winkelmann 2001, Franz and Soskice 1995, Büchel 2002.
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asymmetric training systems. Section 7 concludes and discusses extensions.
2 The Model with Immobile Workers
We shall consider diﬀerent variants of training models to capture diﬀerent
degrees of product market integration and worker mobility.4 Our first model,
the Training Game with Immobile Workers, deals with an integrated product
market, and workers are immobile. It can either be interpreted as the model
of one national market that is completely closed or as the model of a fully
integrated world market.
The structure of the model is as follows. In period 1, firms i = 1, ..., I
simultaneously choose their general human capital investment levels gi ∈
{0, 1}. Thus, for simplicity, we treat training as a zero-one decision. It is best
to think of firms as either having one worker each or a team of workers such
that their human-capital investments are perfect complements, i.e., education
is only valuable if the entire team is educated.5 The eﬀect of training is to
reduce marginal costs ci, which are assumed to be functions c (gi) of the
number of trained workers in a firm. Training costs T > 0 for a firm.
In period 2, the I firms are Cournot competitors, producing homogeneous
goods, with inverse demand p = a− B
I
· x, where x is output, p is price and
a and B are positive constants. Note the dual role of I here. It is not only
the firm number, but also a measure of market size. This is convenient to
analyze the eﬀects of market integration: For instance, when two identical
countries integrate, both the firm number and the market size double.
Recall the standard result that profits in a Cournot oligopoly with inverse
4Some of the results in Vives (2003) address similar issues than the ones discussed in
this section.
5The model of this section can easily be extended to more general choices of training
levels. However, such generalization is less straightforward for the model with mobile
workers (Section 3). To allow for a comparison of both models, we restrict ourselves to
the 0-1 case.
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demand p = a− b · x (b > 0) and marginal costs (c1, ..., cI) are
πi =
1
b (I + 1)2
Ã
a− Ici +
X
j 6=i
· cj
!2
. (1)
To illustrate our results, we use the specific training technology
c (gi) =
c
δgi + 1
for some δ > 0, gi ∈ {0, 1} . (2)
Using (1) and (2), profits of firm i in this case are:
πi (gi, G) =
I
B (I + 1)2
µ
a− cI
δgi + 1
− (G− gi)c
δ + 1
+ (I − 1−G+ gi) c
¶
(3)
where G is the total number of firms, who train their workers.
In this set-up, we give conditions for a symmetric training equilibrium
where all firms train one worker, that is, gi = 1, i = 1, ..., I. To this end, the
following notation is helpful:
∆π ≡ πi (1, I)− πi (0, I − 1) .
Thus ∆π describes the training incentives for a firm when all its competitors
also train their workers. Also, we use the notation α = a− c.
Proposition 1 When workers are immobile, a training equilibrium in an
industry with n firms exists if and only if
∆π = πi (1, I)− πi (0, I − 1) ≥ T.
Proof. By symmetry, it suﬃces to consider the equilibrium condition for
firm 1. Clearly, an equilibrium with training exists if and only if ∆π > T.
Applying (3), it is straightforward to show that
∆π =
δcI2
B (I + 1)2 (1 + δ)2
{2α (1 + δ)− (I − 2) δc} . (4)
Condition (4) implies that a greater value of I has a positive eﬀect on
training if the initial value of I is suﬃciently low, and a negative eﬀect if the
initial value is suﬃciently high.
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Corollary 1 Suppose workers are immobile. As I increases, the range of
parameters α, δ, B, c for which a training equilibrium exists first increases,
then decreases.
Proof. Simple calculations show that
∂ (∆π)
∂I
=
δcI
B (I + 1)3 (1 + δ)2
£
δc
¡
4− 3I − I2
¢
+ 4α (1 + δ)
¤
,
which is positive if and only if
δc
¡
4− 3I − I2
¢
+ 4α (1 + δ) > 0.
There is a unique I∗ > 0 for which the left-hand-side is 0. To the right of I∗,
the left-hand-side is negative.
Figure 1 plots ∆π as a function of I for a = 10, c = 1, B = 1, δ = 0.9.
The figure shows how the eﬀects of globalization on training depend on the
initial number of firms in each country. If firm numbers in each country are
Ik (k = 1, 2), the pre-integration equilibrium in country k corresponds to Ik,
whereas the post-integration equilibrium in the world economy corresponds
to I1+I2. Suppose, for instance that T = 5. Then, if I1 = I2 = 3, there will be
no training equilibrium in either country, as ∆π < T . After product market
integration, there are six firms in the market, with twice the market size of
each country. Now ∆π > T , so that the training equilibrium exists. Hence,
globalization creates a training equilibrium. On the other hand, suppose
each country is initially served by a relatively high number of firms, e.g.
I1 = I2 = 10. Then, there is a training equilibrium before integration. After
integration, the world industry is served by 20 firms, and the corresponding
training incentive satisfies ∆π < T . Thus, in this case, globalization destroys
the training equilibrium.
This example illustrates a principle that occurs repeatedly in this paper:
If the two countries (that is, their firm numbers and market sizes) are small,
the beneficial eﬀects of integration on training that come from greater market
size dominate over the negative eﬀects from greater competition. For greater
7
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Figure 1: Training Incentives with Immobile Workers
initial country sizes, the training equilibrium is destroyed when globalization
takes place.
3 Mobile Workers
In a discussion of globalization and training, worker mobility is important for
two reasons. First, even when workers only move within countries, training
behavior is likely to be aﬀected by worker mobility, because firms have to
take the possibility into account that competitors might poach trained work-
ers. This tends to reduce training levels both before and after integration.
Without further analysis, it is thus unclear how the eﬀects of product mar-
ket integration change when within-country mobility is taken into account.
Second, worker mobility between countries is an aspect of globalization that
is, in itself, worthy of study. How does such mobility aﬀect training incen-
tives? A first intuition would be that training incentives are reduced, because
firms face a greater danger that competitors poach trained worker. We check
whether this intuition is correct.
Before explicitly addressing the comparative statics of globalization in
Sections 4 and 5, we extend our model by introducing an additional stage
8
between training and product market competition, taking into account the
possibility that a firm now has more than one trained worker, because it
poached labor from competitors. The Training Game with Mobile Workers
is therefore defined as follows.
3.1 The Game Structure
The game involves three periods. In period 1, training takes place as before,
resulting in training levels gi ∈ {0, 1}. In stage 2, firms simultaneously make
wage oﬀers for each others workers. Thus, each firm i ∈ {1, ..., I} makes a list
of wage oﬀers wij, j ∈ {1, ..., I} for all of the trained workers in the market. If
gj = 0 wages will be wij = 0, i = 1 . . . I. In principle, we allow wages to diﬀer
even for individuals who have the same level of human capital or belong to the
same firm.6 We normalize wages of non-trained workers to zero. Further, we
assume that the wage of a non-trained worker is also the reservation wage for
the trained workers, that is, their knowledge is useless outside the industry
under consideration. After having obtained the wage oﬀers, each employee
accepts the highest oﬀer.7 Denote the number of trained workers in firm i
at the end of period 2 as ti. Recall that G is the total number of trained
workers in period 1, which is the same as the total number of firms that train
their workers. Hence G =
nP
i=1
ti.
As before, having trained workers is beneficial, as it reduces marginal
production costs. However, as firms can now have more than one trained
worker, we need to define the cost function more generally. Modifying (2)
accordingly, we assume that:
c (ti) =
c
δti + 1
for some δ > 0. (5)
6Here ”wages” should be interpreted broadly, including any type of non-monetary ben-
efits such as pleasant working environments, fringe benefits and flexible working hours
which involve costs for the employer.
7As a tie-breaking rule, we use the convention that the employee stays in his original
firm if this firm oﬀers the highest wages. In some cases, which we will state explicitly, we
deviate from this rule in order to obtain convenient equilibrium formulations.
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In period 3, Cournot competition takes place. As in Section 2, the demand
function is x = I
B
(a− p). Marginal costs are determined by (5).
The game structure is summarized in the Table 1. There and in the
following, we distinguish between net profits and gross profits, according to
whether wages for trained workers are deducted or not. Further, we define the
long-term payoﬀ of a firm as the diﬀerence between net profits and training
expenses.
Table 1: Game Structure
Period 1: Firms i = 1, ..., I choose training levels gi.
Period 2: (i) Firms choose wage oﬀers wi,j(g1, ..., gI).
(ii) Workers choose between employers, thus determining the
numbers ti of trained workers.
Period 3: Product market competition results in gross profits πi(t1, ..., tI).
Gross profits depend on marginal costs, as described in (1). Using (5),
gross profits can therefore be expressed as functions πi(t1, ..., tI). Note that,
as ti can be greater than 1 if a firm poaches the workers of competitors in
stage 2, the notation πi(ti, G) is no longer well-defined, as it is no longer
clear that they are employed by G− ti diﬀerent firms, each of which has one
worker. For firm i, it makes a diﬀerence how the G− ti workers employed by
competitors are distributed across the other firms. We nevertheless continue
to use πi(ti, G), with the following additional conventions on the distribution
of workers:
(i) If G − ti ≤ I − 1 the notation πi(ti, G) refers to the case that every
competitor of firm i has at most one trained worker.
(ii) If G − ti > I − 1 or equivalently if ti = 0 and G = I, the notation
πi(ti, G) refers to the case that one firm has two trained workers while
all other competitors of firm i have one worker.
In order to simplify the notation further, we often neglect the index i and
write π(t, G) if this causes no confusion.
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A full description of the subgame perfect equilibria of the game is com-
plex. We restrict ourselves to providing existence conditions for a symmetric
training equilibrium such that each firm trains one worker. In the rest of
this section, we express equilibrium conditions in reduced form, because the
parameterized conditions are not very transparent. The conditions we ob-
tain make sense beyond the Cournot case. In Section 4, we shall show how
our conditions can be understood in terms of the parameters of the Cournot
example.
3.2 Turnover Equilibrium
We first consider the subgame given by (g1, ..., gI) = (1, ..., 1). We provide a
condition under which, starting from a situation where each firm has trained
a worker in period 1, there will be no turnover in period 2, and we characterize
equilibrium wages. Condition (1) implies that equilibrium gross profits are
π (1, I) =
I
¡
a− c
δ+1
¢2
B (I + 1)2
=
I
¡
α + δc
δ+1
¢2
B (I + 1)2
. (6)
Define
AP (ti, I) =
π (ti, I)− π (1, I)
ti − 1
.
AP (ti, I) can be interpreted as the average productivity of each of the
ti − 1 workers that a firm poaches from competitors. Importantly, from a
firm’s point of view the positive productivity eﬀect of poaching a worker also
consists of the negative eﬀect imposed on the competitor.
Proposition 2 Suppose each firm has trained one worker in period 1.
(a) Suppose
π (1, I)− π (0, I) ≥ π (2, I)− π (1, I) . (7)
Further, suppose that
max
ti∈{2,...,I}
AP (ti, I) ≤ π (2, I)− π (1, I) . (8)
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Then there is an equilibrium of the turnover game where the highest wage for
each worker is given by8
w∗ = π (2, I)− π (1, I) .
In any equilibrium each firm will employ exactly one trained worker.
(b) Suppose that condition (7) does not hold. Then, in any pure strategy
equilibrium there is at least one firm without a trained worker. In equilibrium,
this firm cannot have lower net profits than any firm with a trained worker.
Proof. See Appendix
Intuitively, the equilibrium wage is the willingness of each firm to pay
for a second worker. We shall show in Section 4 that the conditions of this
proposition hold for a wide range of parameters.
Condition (7) guarantees that, starting from an equal distribution of
workers, the gains from attracting a worker (π (2, I)− π (1, I)) are smaller
than the losses if a competitor attracts a worker (π (1, I)− π (0, I)). Thus,
each firm is willing to oﬀer w∗, and there is no turnover.
Condition (8) makes sure that it is not a profitable deviation to attract
further workers from the competitors: no matter how many workers a firm
poaches, the average productivity of a worker will be below the wage, which
is the ”marginal productivity” of the second worker. A simple suﬃcient
condition for (8) is that the marginal productivity π (ti, I) − π (ti − 1, I) is
declining in ti.
To analyze firms incentives to deviate from a training equilibrium, we also
need to consider the subgame where one firm does not invest into training.
Proposition 3 Suppose that, in period 1, I − 1 firms have trained their
workers. Suppose that, in addition,
π (1, I − 1)− π (0, I − 1) ≥ π (2, I − 1)− π (1, I − 1) . (9)
8The equilibrium is supported by wage oﬀers wij = w∗, i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , I.
The equilibrium can also be supported by {wii = w∗, wij+1 = w∗, wI1 = w∗, wII = w∗
for i = 1, . . . , I − 1} and zero wage oﬀers in all other cases.
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and
max
ti∈{2,...,I−1}
AP (ti, I − 1) ≤ π (1, I − 1)− π (0, I − 1) (10)
Then, the resulting turnover game has an equilibrium, where each worker
receives a wage oﬀer of w∗ = π (1, I − 1) − π (0, I − 1). Accordingly, net
profits for all firms are π (0, I − 1).
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Note that (9) is analogous to (7), but for I − 1 instead of I. However,
composed to the right hand side of (8), the right hand side of (10) is smaller.
Intuitively, compared to the case that all firms have trained their workers,
each worker now has greater bargaining power, because trained workers are
relatively scarce: By moving to the competitor without a trained worker,
product market profits of an employer could be reduced by π (1, I − 1) −
π (0, I − 1). Net profits π (0, I − 1) are smaller than what firms would have
obtained without training.
Propositions 2 and 3 allow us to analyze the conditions under which a
training equilibrium exist, provided the parameters are such that (7)-(10)
all hold simultaneously. As we will see in a numerical example below, (8)
and (10) hold for many parameter values. (7) and (9) still hold for a fairly
large set of parameters, so that it is already an interesting exercise to restrict
the search for training equilibria to the parameter regions where all four
conditions hold.
However, it would also be interesting to extend the analysis beyond these
regions, in particular, because the extent of globalization (appropriately de-
fined) has an influence on whether conditions (7)-(10) are satisfied. Unfor-
tunately, the analysis becomes more complex when (7) does not hold.
In Appendix 2, we provide a typical example for the turnover game when
condition (7) does not hold. In equilibrium half of the firms have 2 workers,
whereas the other half of firms do not employ trained workers. Equilibrium
profits are the same for all firms.
A further complication arises since the tie-breaking rule that describes
where workers stay in case of indiﬀerence must be modified when conditions
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(7) and (9) do not hold. We use the following tie-breaking rule in this case.
Firms that do not train will end up with no trained employees. The remaining
distribution of trained workers is determined by equilibrium requirements.
Hence, if a firm does not train, it will end up without a worker in the turnover
game, no matter whether condition (9) holds or not. Thus, a firm that
deviates from a training equilibrium will earn profits corresponding to the
gross profit of a firm with no trained worker facing I − 1 workers that are,
however, not necessarily distributed equally across competitors when the
conditions of Proposition 3 are violated.
Usually, the profits of a firm without a trained worker should be higher,
the lower the number of trained workers employed by the competitors. These
considerations motivate the following assumption.
Assumption 1 When the conditions of Propositions 2a or 3 do not hold,
net profits for a firm are lower in the subgame where each firm trains one
worker than in the subgame where this firm deviates to ”No Training”.
The reason we have formulated this statement as an assumption rather
than a result is that there is a snag in the argument just presented. Clearly,
the statement will be true if, in the training case, the distribution of workers
across competitors relative to the deviation case is such that one firm has an
additional worker and all the others have the same number of workers. So
far, however, we have not established such a result about the distribution of
workers, so we have stated the condition on net profits as an assumption.
3.3 Training Equilibrium
Using Propositions 2 and 3, it is straightforward to delineate parameter re-
gions for which an equilibrium with training exists.
Proposition 4 Suppose (8) and (10) hold. A training equilibrium exists if
2π (1, I)− π (2, I)− π (0, I − 1) ≥ T. (11)
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Suppose that, in addition, Assumption 1 holds. Then, no training equilibrium
will exist if (11) is violated.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The intuition for the if-part is straightforward. Gross product market
profits in a training equilibrium are π (1, I). (11) implies (7). Thus, there is
no turnover in the second stage and wages are π (2, I)−π (1, I) and net profits
are 2π (1, I)− π (2, I). Deviating to ”no training” would lead to π (0, I − 1).
Thus, (11) is a suﬃcient condition for a training equilibrium.
The argument for the second statement is similar as long as (7) holds.
When (7) is violated, Assumption 1 is required to understand why deviation
from training is a profitable alternative: Essentially, the deviating firms prof-
its are determined as if it was facing less workers trained by the competitors.
4 A Numerical Example
Much of the following analysis will rely on specific parameterizations of our
Cournot model. We set a = 10, b = 1, c = 1. We analyze the game for three
diﬀerent values of δ, namely 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. Further, we allow I to vary
between 2 and 25.
For the analysis of the turnover game, we consider conditions (7)-(10).
For the relevant parameters, (8) and (10) are indeed satisfied. Figure 2 deals
with (7), which is equivalent to
∆MPT ≡ π (2, I)− π (1, I)− (π (1, I)− π (0, I)) ≤ 0.
Thus, the change in the marginal productivity of training has to be non-
posititve for an equilibrium without training to exist. Figure 2 plots |∆MPT |
for diﬀerent values of δ. The highest line corresponds to δ = 0.9, the lower
lines to δ = 0.5 and δ = 0.1, respectively.
Note that the conditions of Proposition 2 hold when the functions plot-
ted in Figure 2 have non-negative values. Thus, for all parameters under
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Figure 2: Turnover Game
consideration, an equilibrium without turnover exists when I is not too high.
Therefore, product market integration can lead from an equilibrium without
turnover to one with turnover.
Next, for each value of δ, we analyze the circumstances under which a
training equilibrium exists. Recall that this can only happen for values of I
below the critical levels defined by Figure 2. Assuming that parameters are
such that there is no turnover in the second period, the training equilibrium
exists when
θ (I) ≡ π (1, I)− π (0, I − 1)− (π (2, I)− π (1, I)) ≥ T .
The left-hand side can be interpreted as the net training incentive, that
is, the maximal willingness to pay for training. Figure 3 depicts training
incentives as a function of I for the diﬀerent values of δ.
In all three cases, training incentives are first increasing, then decreasing
in I. For δ = 0.1 (lower curve), there is no value of I for which training
incentives are positive. As δ increases, there is an intermediate range of I-
values for which training incentives are positive. This region is greater for
δ = 0.9 than for δ = 0.5.
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Figure 3: Training Incentives
5 The Eﬀects of Globalization
5.1 Introduction
We now analyze the eﬀects of labor and product market integration on train-
ing behavior. We proceed as outlined in Figure 4.
  
Product Market Integration (5.3) 
 
Autarky  Full Integration (5.2) 
 Labor Market Integration (5.4) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Types of Integration
Our reference case is autarky. In the autarky model, we suppose the
product markets in both countries are fully separated. Labor is fully mobile
within countries, but not mobile between countries. Thus, each country k
(k = 1, 2) is described by the model of Section 3, with I = Ik. In Section
5.2 we shall analyze how training behavior is aﬀected when we move from
autarky to the opposite extreme, full integration of both product and labor
markets. Again, this case corresponds to the model of Section 3, but now
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with I = I1+I2. To understand the individual contributions of both types of
integration, we then move on to consider the eﬀects of pure product market
integration in Section 5.3: What are the eﬀects of product market integration,
when labor is only allowed to move within countries? In Section 5.4, we
consider pure labor market integration. There, we analyze the eﬀects of labor
market integration when product markets remain separated.
5.2 Full Integration
The numerical analysis gives an idea about the eﬀects of full integration.
To understand the eﬀects of globalization on training incentives, we have to
compare net training incentives for I1 and I2 with those for I1 + I2. To this
end, suppose the parameters are such that, qualitatively, training incentives
are given as in Figure 3, that is:
(1) Training incentives are single peaked as a function of I.
(2) Training incentives have two intersections with the I-axis to the right
of I = 2.
Thus, if both I1 and I2 are suﬃciently small that I1 + I2 is still in the
upward sloping part of θ (I) (or not too much further to the right), integration
increases training incentives. As I1 and I2 increase, this is no longer true. For
instance, when both values are near the maximum, net training incentives
after integration will clearly be smaller than before. Thus, roughly speaking,
integration has a positive eﬀect on training if the countries are initially small
and a negative eﬀect if the countries are initially large.
Of course, the exact eﬀect of integration on training also depends on the
level of training costs. When θ (I1) < T and θ (I2) < T , but θ (I1 + I2) > T
, integration induces training. Conversely, when θ (I1) > T and θ (I2) > T ,
but θ (I1 + I2) < T , integration destroys the training equilibrium.
The intuition for this non-monotonicity still needs to be clarified. In con-
trast to the immobile case, there are three eﬀects. First, increasing market
size increases the returns to training. Second, the increasing number of com-
petitors reduces the returns to training. Third, wages π (2, I) − π (1, I)for
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trained workers tend to increase when I is suﬃciently large.
5.3 Pure Product Market Integration
The last subsection does not spell out to which extent the eﬀects of integra-
tion are attributable to product and labor market integration, respectively.
Therefore, we now sketch how training incentives would be aﬀected by pure
product market integration, without international mobility of workers.
First, reconsider the turnover game when each firm in the global econ-
omy has trained one worker. Under conditions (7) and (8), the equilibrium
described in Proposition 2 would still exist for I = I1+ I2, as long as I1 ≥ 2,
I2 ≥ 2: Even though the turnover game is now only played between the
firms within the country, the willingness to pay for a second worker is still
(π (2, I)− π (1, I)), whereas the willingness to pay for the first worker is
π (1, I) − π (0, I). Condition (8) can even be weakened somewhat: As firms
can only poach workers from national competitors, the upward deviations
are limited to cases where ti ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ik}.
Similar arguments hold for Proposition 3, which concerns the turnover
game when one firm has deviated from training: Intuitively, being able to
move to one competitor gives the workers bargaining power vis-à-vis their
employers. Adding further potential employers does not increase this bar-
gaining power: After all, the worker can only be poached by one employer.
Thus, when product markets integrate, the eﬀects on wages are essentially
independent of whether labor market integration takes place are not.
If international mobility has no eﬀect on the turnover equilibrium, it has
no eﬀect on net wages and thus on training incentives either. Thus, somewhat
surprisingly, starting from autarky, pure product market integration has the
same eﬀects on training as full integration. In other words, international
labor market integration has no eﬀect on training incentives.
Of course, the argument relies on our assumption that trained labor is
homogeneous and firms therefore do not diﬀer with respect to the type of
labor they require. Without this assumption, international labor mobility
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should increase the chances for workers to find a suitable employer, and
therefore the bargaining power.
5.4 Pure Labor Market Integration
The last subsection showed that labor market integration has no additional
eﬀects on training if product market integration also takes place. Of course,
it is still possible that labor market integration aﬀects training decisions
when there is no product market integration. However, similar arguments
as in 5.3 show that labor market integration has no eﬀect as long as there
are at least two firms in each markets: Equilibrium wages in the case that
all firms in country k train are given by the net eﬀect that a second worker
would have on profits, which is π (2, Ik) − π (1, Ik). The argument for the
deviation game is analogous, so that the training equilibrium exists when
2π (1, Ik)− π (2, Ik)− π (0, Ik − 1) ≥ T , just as in the autarky case.
6 Diﬀerent Training Systems
6.1 The Model
Until now we have considered the impact of globalization when firms in both
countries have access to the same training technologies. Countries diﬀer,
however, in this respect (see e.g Ryan 2001). Hence, it is of particular in-
terest how particular training systems will fare in a more globalized world.
Our focus will be on apprenticeship systems of the German type that have
become the focus of much recent literature9. This literature largely con-
cludes that firms are willing to pay a share of the training costs, although
the qualifications apprentices obtain are predominantly general skills.
9See Franz and Soskice 1995, Oulton and Steedman 1994, Harhoﬀ and Kane 1997,
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Euwals and Winkelmann 2001, Büchel 2002, Clark and Fahr
2001
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We now provide a stylized model showing how the integration of countries
with diﬀerent training systems might aﬀect incentives of firms to invest in
general training of employees. For this purpose we suppose country 1 has an
apprenticeship system where I1 ≥ 2 firms train their workers as described in
Sections 3 and 4, whereas, in country 2, firms use workers whose training is
publicly funded. Formally, we simply suppose that in country 2 there are I2
firms with marginal costs of c− ε, ε ≥ 0.10
We assume that labor is mobile only within national borders. Hence, as
an immediate consequence of Proposition 4 we have:
Corollary 2 Suppose that (8) and (10) hold. Before globalization a training
equilibrium in country 1 exists if
2π(1, I1)− π(2, I1)− π(0, I1 − 1) ≥ T
Suppose now that the firms from countries 1 and 2 compete in a global
market place. Profits of firms in country 1 are described by the notation
π˜i(ti, G) with the same conventions as in Section 3.1. π˜i(ti, G) is the profit of
a firm i if it has ti trained workers, and G− ti trained workers are employed
by competitors.11
Hence, we obtain:
Proposition 5 A training equilibrium in the model with diﬀerent training
systems exists if and only if
2π˜(1, I1)− π˜(2, I1)− π˜(0, I1 − 1) > T.
In the following we examine how training incentives in country 1 are
aﬀected by changes in I2, where I2 = 0 represents the autarky case. For that
purpose we concentrate on the specific cost function c(ti) =
c
δ ti + 1
for some
δ > 0.
10Hence, ε is the net cost eﬀect which incorporates the productivity eﬀect of trained
workers and associated wage costs. When firms have to pay taxes to finance public voca-
tional schools, such tax eﬀects would have to be included as well.
11Obviously, eπi (tiG) also depends on I2; but we suppress this variable.
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6.2 Example
We now present some simple illustrations for the eﬀects of international com-
petition between training systems.12 We distinguish two cases. In the first
case, country 1 faces competition by firms in country 2 that have trained
workers, i.e. ci = 1δ+1 or equivalently, ε = c
δ
δ+1
. In the second case, country
2 has only low-skilled workers, i.e. ε = 0. For all figures we choose α = 9,
b = 1 and c = 1.
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Figure 5: Systems Competition, δ = 0.9
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Figure 6: Low-Skill Competition, δ = 0.9
12In Appendix 8.3, we list all relevant payoﬀ functions.
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Figure 7: Systems Competition, δ = 0.5
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Figure 8: Low-Skill Competition, δ = 0.5
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Figure 9: Systems Competition, δ = 0.1
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Figure 10: Low-Skill Competition, δ = 0.1
Figures 5, 7 and 9 show training incentives as functions of I1 and I2
for diﬀerent values of δ (δ = 0.9, δ = 0.5 and δ = 0.1) in the case of publicly
funded training. Similarly, Figures 6, 8 and 10 give training incentives for
competition from low skill countries. By and large, the figures echo the com-
mon theme of this paper. Globalization on a small scale, i.e., for suﬃciently
small I2, may increase incentives to train. For larger values of I2, product
market integration unambiguously lowers benefits from training.13 However,
the examples suggest that the positive eﬀects of globalization for small values
of I2 are less pronounced and even disappear in many cases. Hence, systems
competition may be an even larger threat to apprenticeship systems than
the integrations of product markets where all firms are subject to the same
training technologies.
The preceding discussion provides a possible explanation of the decline
in the number of apprentices over the last decade in Germany. Euwals and
Winkelmann (2001) explain this decline with demographic and compositional
factors. Our theoretical analysis suggests that globalization might have ac-
celerated the decline of the apprenticeship system. With such forces under-
mining the sustainability of the system, education policy faces the diﬃcult
decision whether incentives to stabilize the system should be increased.
13(see for instance the examples with δ = 0.5 for these patterns)
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7 Conclusions and Extensions
Our paper makes two main points. First, the eﬀects of product market
integration on training incentives are positive when the initial country sizes
are small and negative when country sizes are large. Second, if trained labor is
homogeneous, labor market integration has essentially no eﬀects on training.
As yet, our approach uses several simplifying assumptions. For instance,
we have treated training as a zero-one decision. It is perceivable that a
continuous treatment of training levels would lead to qualitative changes of
the results, even in the immobile worker case.
Another simplification concerns the exogeneity of firm entry decisions. In
our approach, integration does not aﬀect the total number of firms in the
market: The number of firms in the integrated market is simply the sum of
firms in each market. Alternatively, one could consider a setting where the
firm number is endogenous and firms might enter or exit as integration takes
place. Vives (2003) considers this possibility for a situation resembling our
case of immobile workers. It would be desirable to integrate his approach
with the case of mobile workers discussed in Section 3.
25
8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
8.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First, we show that, if (7) and (8) hold, there is indeed an equilibrium such
that each worker is oﬀered w∗ by each firm, and therefore each firm employs
exactly one worker at the end of the turnover game. By condition (7), the
gross profit reduction from having no trained worker rather than one out-
weighs the reduction in wage payments w∗, so that reducing the wage oﬀer
is not a profitable deviation. Conversely, to attract more trained workers,
one has to oﬀer them wages slightly above w∗. A firm that attempts to get
ti − 1 additional workers, will obtain gross profits πi (ti, I), but it will have
to pay wages of πi (2, I) − πi (1, I) per worker. The relevant non-deviation
condition is thus
πi (ti, I)− πi (1, I) ≤ (ti − 1) [πi (2, I)− πi (1, I)] for all ti ≥ 2. (12)
Clearly, (8) and (12) are equivalent.
Next, suppose in equilibrium workers are not distributed equally. Then,
one firm (say firm 1) has at least two workers, whereas some other firms
have none. By conditions (7) and (8), firm 1 is willing to pay at most
πi (1, I) − πi (0, I) on average for each of its workers. As the firms from
which firm 1 has poached the workers would also be willing to pay that
quantity to retain their workers, the amount does not suﬃce to poach the
workers.
(b) Suppose that condition (7) does not hold, i.e.,
π (2, I)− π (1, I) > π (1, I)− π (0, I) .
First, a symmetric training equilibrium requires that wages are at most
π (1, I) − π (0, I) ; otherwise firms could profitably deviate by reducing the
wage so that they do not employ a worker. By condition (7), with such a pro-
posed equilibrium wage, firms could profitably deviate by oﬀering a slightly
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higher wage, so as to employ a second worker. Thus any subgame equilib-
rium must involve an asymmetric distribution of workers across firms.
Now suppose that in equilibrium two firms i, j have diﬀerent net profits. This
requires that both firms have diﬀerent numbers of workers, ti 6= tj. Assume
w.l.o.g. that ti < tj. If firm i has smaller net profits, it can deviate by
oﬀering slightly higher wages to (tj − ti) workers of firm j, so that workers
go to firm i and it approximately earns the higher net profits of firm j. Note
that no other firm oﬀers the same wages in the candidate equilibrium since
otherwise workers would not stay at firm j.
8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If each firm oﬀers w∗, all firms receive net profits π (0, I − 1). First, consider
deviation incentives for firms that employ a trained worker in equilibrium,
that is, firms with gross profits π (1, I − 1) who pay wages π (1, I − 1) −
π (0, I − 1). Downward deviations (below w∗) for such firms would not be
profitable. They would not have to pay wages, but gross profits would drop to
π (0, I − 1). By increasing wages slightly above w∗, a firm could obtain addi-
tional workers. Gross profits from hiring ti− 1 workers would be π (ti, I − 1)
rather than π (1, I − 1). Subtracting wage payments, the net gain from de-
viation is thus
π (ti, I − 1)− π (1, I − 1)− (ti − 1) (π (1, I − 1)− π (0, I − 1)) < 0.
By (10), this expression is negative. Next, consider the incentives of the firm
without a worker to increase its wage oﬀer slightly. This would increase gross
profits by π (1, I − 1)−π (0, I − 1), but increase wages by the same amount.
More generally, increasing wage oﬀers to any number (ti − 1) of workers is
not profitable by (10).
8.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Again, we consider only firm 1. Clearly, π (0, I − 1) > π (0, I). Thus, if
condition (11) holds, so does (7). Thus, by Proposition 2, if each firm trains
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a worker in period 1, there will be no turnover in period 2, and wages are given
by π (2, I) − π (1, I). As gross profits in the proposed training equilibrium
are π (1, I), long-term payoﬀs are
2π (1, I)− π (2, I)− T. (13)
If firm 1 deviates to ”no training”, proposition 3 implies that its long term
payoﬀ becomes
π (0, I − 1) . (14)
It remains to show that there is no training equilibrium if (11) does not
hold. First suppose (7) holds. Then, there is a turnover equilibrium in the
second stage, and analogous arguments as above show there is no training
equilibrium. Now suppose (7) does not hold. Then, by Assumption 1, by
deviating to ”no training” a firm earns higher net profits than before training.
In addition, it saves training costs. Thus, the deviation must be profitable.
8.2 Appendix 2: The Turnover Game without (6)
We now describe a typical equilibrium configuration when condition (7) does
not hold. We shall have to deal with situations where same firms have more
than one trained worker, but others have none. Specifically, we consider the
following notation.
• s2,0−i : competitors of firm i have either two or 0 trained workers from the
remaining G− ti employees.
• sˆ2,0−i : one competitor of firm i has 1 trained worker. The remaining competi-
tors either have two employees or none.
If there are I trained workers in the industry, of which ti work for firm
i, whereas the rest is distributed according to s2,0−i , we denote profits as
πi(ti, I, s
2,0
−i ). Similarly, we use the notation πi(ti, I, sˆ
2,0
−i ).
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Proposition 6 Suppose I = 2N , that
2π(1, I, sˆ2,0−i )− π(2, I, s
2,0
−i )− π(0, I, s
2,0
−i ) < 0
and that
max
ti ∈{3,...,I
(
π(ti, I, s−i)− π(0, I, sˆ2,0−i )
ti
)
<
π(2, I, s2,0−i )− π(0, I, sˆ
2,0
−i )
2
.
Then, there exists an equilibrium of the turnover game with wages w∗ =
π(2,I,s2,0−i )−π(0,I,s
2,0
−i )
2
where N firms have 2 workers and N firms have no work-
ers. Equilibrium profits are identical for all firms and given by π
¡
0, I, s2,0−i
¢
.
Proof. (i) It is never beneficial for a firm without a worker to hire two
workers. Hence (ii) suppose a firm with no worker hires one worker by oﬀering
a slightly higher wage. The net profits are at most
π
¡
1, I, sˆ2,0−i
¢
−
π
¡
2, I, s2,0−i
¢
− π
¡
0, I, s2,0−i
¢
2
.
This is smaller than equilibrium profits π
¡
0, I, s2,0−i
¢
if
2π
¡
1, I, sˆ2,0−i
¢
− π
¡
2, I, s2,0−i
¢
− π
¡
0, I, s2,0−i
¢
< 0
which holds by assumption. Again we need to check whether firms do not
want to hire more than 2 workers. This is implied by the second condition.
(iii) Suppose a firm with two workers does only want to hire one worker. The
same considerations as in (ii) apply.
8.3 Appendix 3: Competition between Training Sys-
tems
This Appendix contains the Payoﬀs that were used in the calculations in
Section 6.
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π˜i (1, I1) =
µ
α +
δc
δ + 1
+ I2
δc
δ + 1
− I2ε
¶2
,
π˜i (2, I1) =
µ
α + I1c
µ
1
δ + 1
− 1
2δ + 1
¶
+ 2c
δ
δ + 1
+ I2c
2δ
2δ + 1
− I2ε
¶2
,
π˜i (0, I1 − 1) =
µ
α− I1c
δ
δ + 1
+ c
δ
δ + 1
− I2ε
¶2
.
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